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the provisions of the APA. {S. GO]
AB 88 (Kelley) would exempt from the
APA the WRCB's adoption or revision of
state policy for water quality control and
water quality control plans and guidelines;
the issuance of waste discharge requirements, permits, and waivers; and the issuance or waiver of water quality certifications. The bill would require WRCB
and its regional boards to provide notice
to specified persons and organizations,
prepare written responses to comments
from the public, and maintain an administrative record in connection with the
adoption or revision of state policy for
water quality control and water quality
control plans and guidelines. [S. A WR]
AB 1736 (Campbell) would have
specified that no exemption to any
provision of the State Contract Act,
whether by statute, regulation, or in the
State Administrative Manual, shall apply
to any action taken by OAL to have the
CCR or updates to the CCR compiled,
printed, or published by anyone other than
a state agency. This bill died in committee.
AB 2060 (Polanco), as amended May
15, would have required state agencies
and air pollution control districts to adopt
rules and regulations creating a variance
process, whereby an individual or private
entity may apply for relief from regulations adopted by that governmental agency, and would have required every such
agency to adopt a procedure for an appeal
of any decision that leads to orders, sanctions, or fines being given to private individuals or entities, including the denial
of a variance. This bill died in committee.
LITIGATION:
In Engelmann v. State Board of
Education, 2 Cal. App. 4th 47 (1991), the
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed
the Sacramento County Superior Court's
holding that the governing procedures and
criteria used by the State Board of Education in selecting textbooks for use in
public schools must be adopted pursuant
to the APA. { 12:1 CRLR 29] The Board's
petition for review is presently pending
before the California Supreme Court.
On April 27, the Third District Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial court's holding in Fair Political Practices Commissum (FPPC) v. Office of Administrative
Law, et al., No. C010924. In an unpublished decision, the Third District
upheld the lower court's finding that
FPPC regulatory actions are subject to
review under the APA only as it existed at
the time of the electorate's 1974 approval
of the Political Reform Act which, inter
alia, created the FPPC. OAL, its authority
to review agency regulations, and the six
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criteria upon which its review is based
were not created until 1980. { 12: 1 CRLR
29]

In other litigation, the state Water
Resources Control Board's appeal of the
final judgment in State Water Resources
Control Board and the Regional Quality
Control Board, San Francisco Region v.
Office of Administrative Law, No.
A054559, is still pending in the First District Court of Appeal. In a judgment
favorable to OAL, the trial court held that
the wetland rules at issue are regulations
within the meaning of the APA; the rules
are not exempt from the APA; and since
the rules were not adopted pursuant to the
APA, they are unenforceable. { 12: 1 CRLR
29]

OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR
GENERAL
Acting Auditor General: Kurt Sjoberg
(916) 445-0255

The Office of the Auditor General
(OAG) is the nonpartisan auditing and
investigating arm of the California legislature. OAG is under the direction of the
Joint Legislative Audit Committee
(JLAC), which is comprised of fourteen
members, seven each from the Assembly
and Senate. JLAC has the authority to
"determine the policies of the Auditor
General, ascertain facts, review reports
and take action thereon ... and make
recommendations to the Legislature ... concerning the state audit...
revenues and expenditures .... " (Government Code section 10501.) OAG may
"only conduct audits and investigations
approved by" JLAC.
Government Code section I 0527
authorizes OAG "to examine any and all
books, accounts, reports, vouchers, correspondence files, and other records, bank
accounts, and money or other property of
any agency of the state ... and any public
entity, including any city, county, and special district which receives state
funds ... and the records and property of
any public or private entity or person subject to review or regulation by the agency
or public entity being audited or investigated to the same extent that employees
of that agency or public entity have access."
OAG has three divisions: the Financial
Audit Division, which performs the traditional CPA fiscal audit; the Investigative
Audit Division, which investigates allegations of fraud, waste and abuse in state
government received under the Reporting
of Improper Governmental Activities Act
(Government Code sections I 0540 et

seq.); and the Performance Audit

Division, which reviews programs funded
by the state to determine if they are efficient and cost effective.
MAJOR PROJECTS:
Conflict of Interest Code Revisions
Approved. OAG's revisions to its conflict
of interest code, which were reviewed and
approved by the Fair Political Practices
Commission, were approved by the Office
of Administrative Law on March 19.[ 12:1
CRLR 30] The revised code designates
OAG employees who must disclose certain investments, income, and interests in
real property and business positions, and
disqualify themselves from making or
participating in governmental decisions
affecting those interests.
RECENT AUDITS:
Report No. P-069 (January 1992) examines the Public Utilities Commission's
(PUC) intervenor compensation program,
which was established in Public Utilities
Code section 180 I et seq. to promote
public involvement in proceedings involving utility companies by compensating certain intervenors for their participation and contribution. The audit was conducted in response to a request from
Senator Robert Presley, who has received
numerous complaints from public interest
group intervenors that the PUC's interpretation of the statutes creating the intervenor compensation mechanism actually
stifles public participation in Commission
proceedings rather than encouraging it.
{12:1 CRLR 23, 30, 186-87; 11:4 CRLR
206; JO: 1 CRLR 1/

Under the statutory scheme, public interest intervenors are required to participate in sometimes years-long proceedings with no assurance that they are even
eligible for intervenor compensation. This
approach works hardships on intervenor
groups, which must wait until the conclusion of the proceeding to learn whether,
in the eyes of the Commission, they have
made a "substantial contribution" to a
PUC decision on one or more issues. Then
they must file a detailed, itemized compensation request, and wait months or
even years for a PUC ruling on the request.
One of the chief complaints of intervenors
is the lengthy delay between participation,
the decision on the merits of the proceeding, and the decision on the compensation
request. OAG's report noted that the PUC
is required by law to make a decision on
the merits of an intervenor's compensation request within specified time limits.
However, in 32 of the last 38 compensation decisions completed during the last
three fiscal years, the PUC exceeded the
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decision deadline by an average of four
months. OAG also found that in 24 of the
38 decisions reviewed, intervenors did not
file for compensation within 30 days of the
case decision, as is required by law. However, in all but six of the 24, the PUC
allowed exceptions to the intervenors'
filing deadlines.
OAG also noted that the PUC is not
required to determine intervenors'
eligibility to seek compensation at any
specific time after the intervenors have
filed eligibility requests. As a result, OAG
found that intervenors may participate in
lengthy proceedings without any assurance from the PUC that they will be
eligible to request compensation.
OAG also noted that statutory restrictions and the PUC's interpretation of
relevant law may limit compensation
amounts paid to intervenors and inhibit
intervenor participation in PUC proceedings. For example, the law requires the
PUC to adopt at least part of an
intervenor's presentation in order for the
intervenor to be compensated for making
a substantial contribution to a PUC
proceeding. Once this is established, however, the PUC generally awards compensation only for costs related to that portion
of the intervenor's presentation adopted;
such conditions make it difficult for intervenors to receive reimbursement for all of
their costs of participating in PUC
proceedings. Also, the PUC has stated its
intent to formally review the necessity of
compensating intervenors for the time required by intervenors to prepare their
detailed compensation requests. OAG
stated that lack of compensation for this
cost would further inhibit public interest
intervenors from participating in PUC
proceedings. OAG also noted that intervenors cannot request compensation until
after the PUC issues a case decision; intervenors may be deterred by the financial
burden imposed by lengthy proceedings.
OAG recommended that the PUC take
the following actions to improve its intervenor compensation program:
-continue to reimburse intervenors for
the costs incurred in preparing their compensation requests;
-require PUC administrative law
judges (ALJs) to complete proposed compensation decisions in time to allow
necessary internal review and public comment before the deadline required by law;
-ensure that both intervenors and ALJs
are aware of the deadlines for filing
eligibility and compensation requests; and
-issue an eligibility decision before the
compensation decision.
OAG also recommended that the legislature take the following actions to ensure

that the legislative intent of the intervenor
compensation program is being carried
out:
-determine whether the current definition of "substantial contribution" and the
PUC's applicatiQn of this definition are
consistent with the intent of the program;
-determine whether the PUC's current
practice of prorating intervenors' expenses by the intervenors' degree of success
on each issue in which they participate is
consistent with the intent of the program;
-determine whether advance funding
should be provided to intervenors and, if
so, develop an alternative funding
mechanism to provide initial start-up
loans, interim loans, or both, to credible
intervenors;
-determine whether there is a necessity
for requiring a PUC ruling to establish an
intervenor's eligibility to request compensation; and
-require the PUC to rule on eligibility
requests within a specified time.
Report No. F-066 (January 1992) is
an analysis of the state's compliance with
requirements for entering into consultant
contracts. The Department of General Services (DGS) is responsible for providing
administrative oversight of state departments (including every state office,
department, division, bureau, board, or
commission, excluding the legislature, the
courts, and any agency in the judicial
branch of state government) entering into
consultant contracts. Several issues discussed in this report were also addressed
in an October 1991 OAG report entitled
The Department of General Services' Administrative Oversight of State Agencies
That Award Contracts (P-014). [12:1
CRLR 30]
Initially, OAG found that many departments are confused by the definition of the
term "consultant services contract" in
determining whether certain contracts are
consultant contracts or other services contacts. Public Contract Code section 10356
defines consultant contracts as providing
"services which are of an advisory nature,
provide a recommended course of action
or personal expertise, have an end product
which is basically a transmittal of information either written or verbal and which
is related to the governmental functions of
state agency administration and management and state agency program management or innovation, and which are obtained by awarding a procurement-type
contract, a grant, or any other payment of
funds for services of the above type." Existing law requires control procedures for
consultant contracts beyond those required for other services contracts. As a
result of departments' confusion over
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what constitutes a consultant contract,
OAG found that the state frequently fails _
to comply with certain legal requirements.
For example, at six out of nineteen departments, 46% of the consultant contracts
reviewed by OAG were not approved
before contract work was begun, as required by law. In one Department of
Health Services consultant contract, a
contractor began work approximately
nine months before the contract was approved.
In addition, for 45% of the contracts
reviewed at six of the nineteen departments, the departments failed to review
post-evaluations or to require resumes of
appropriate contractor personnel before
contract approval. OAG also found a lack
of compliance with the requirement that
departments complete contractors'
evaluations within 60 days of completion
of the contract. Seven of the nineteen
departments reviewed failed to complete
twelve contractors' evaluations promptly.
Finally, OAG noted problems in the
departments' compliance with requirements for sole-source contracting. OAG
found that the evidence used by some
departments to justify certain sole-source
contracts was inadequate, and some
departments' annual consultant contract
reports did not follow applicable reporting
requirements and identify whether contracts were sole-source contracts.
OAG recommended that DGS take the
following actions to improve its effectiveness:
-determine if contracting departments
are appropriately distinguishing between
consultant and other services contracts
and, if not, provide clarification of the
distinction;
-require its Office of Legal Services
(OLS) to promptly implement all necessary procedures to maintain accurate
statistics on the number of late contracts
received from individual departments so
DGS can take appropriate action;
-require departments to prepare written evidence of their review of negative
evaluations, if any, of proposed contractors, and submit this evidence with other
contract documents to OLS for approval;
-require state departments to certify
annually that they have prepared the required evaluations of completed contracts
and submitted any negative evaluations to
OLS;
-restrict or terminate the authority to
enter into consultant contracts of any
department that is not appropriately completing, retaining, and submitting evaluations;
-reiterate what information is required
in departments' annual reports on consult-
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ant contracts, and include in its own
reports a clear indication when DGS has
not assessed the completeness of the
reports submitted by contracting departments; and
-require close adherence to the requirements for sole-source status as found
in section 1236 of the State Administrative
Manual.
Report No. A-201 (January 1992)
highlights selected audits conducted by
OAG from July 1990 through December
1991. During that period, OAG issued 6 I
audit reports which it has grouped into six
areas: education, health and welfare,
transportation and environment, justice,
government operations, and financial administration. OAG 's report highlights
several audits from each of the six areas,
and-in response to the question, "who
audits the auditors?"-includes two
opinions by outside auditors on OAG's
own financial operations and audit
quality.
Report No. P-064 (February 1992)
concerns the office productivity, staffing
standards, personnel classifications, and
revenue requirements at the Board of
Vocational Nurse and Psychiatric Technician Examiners. This Board is responsible for licensing vocational nurses and
psychiatric technicians, enforcing its
professional performance standards, and
examining and approving the programs
that educate and train its licensees.
OAG noted that over the four fiscal
years ending June 30, 1991, the Board's
expenditures in support of its vocational
nurse program increased 61 %; according
to OAG, much of the increase was either
justified or beyond the Board's control.
For example, OAG found that increased
expenditures for salaries were justified
given the Board's workload. Also, cost of
living increases that were implemented by
the Board were determined by other agencies and were thus beyond the Board's
control.
OAG found that the Board unnecessarily keeps automated records of expired
licenses; OAG estimated that the Board
could save $5,000 per year by routinely
purging these records. As a result, during
OAG's audit, the Board instituted a policy
of periodically purging records it does not
need from the automated records maintained for the Board by the Department of
Consumer Affairs (DCA).
OAG also found that the Board had
revised the duties of one of its staff members without notifying DCA's personnel
office; as a result, that staff member is not
performing duties that justify her classification. OAG recommended that the
Board work with DCA's personnel office
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to correct that employee's classification.
In addition, OAG recommended that the
Board inform DCA's personnel office of
any changes in the duties of its staff, including past changes of which the personnel office may not be aware.
Report No. P-44 (February 1992) is
the third in a series of semiannual reports
concerning how the Department of Health
Services (DHS) processes reimbursement
requests for certain prescribed drugs
under the Medi-Cal program; this report
reviews DHS' process for counting and
compiling data on drug treatment
authorization requests (TARs) received
and processed from June 1990 through
November 1991. [11:4 CRLR 48; 11:2
CRLR45]
For this report, OAG reviewed data
regarding drug TARs received by
telephone, fax, mail, and DHS' automated
voice-response system, VDTS. As of
November 1991, however, DHS no longer
accepts telephone calls from providers for
the purpose of processing drug TARs.
OAG also reviewed data on the number of
drug TARs approved, modified, denied,
and returned from June 1990 through
November 1991.
OAG found that DHS received approximately 5,500 more drug TARs
during the six-month period from June
1991 through November 1991 than it did
during the same period in 1990. According
to OAG, the increase may be attributable
to a 20% increase in Medi-Cal
beneficiaries eligible to obtain drugs
through the program. However, OAG
found that DHS' drug units are taking
longer than the time allowed by law to
process mail-in drug TARs. These delays
occurred primarily because of staff reductions at the San Francisco drug unit, which
was scheduled to close in April, and the
lack of any staff increases at DHS' other
drug units.
OAG also reviewed the methods used
by the drug units for measuring the time it
takes them to respond to a drug TAR from
the time it is received to the time the
completed TAR is returned to the provider.
In its July 1991 report, OAG noted that
TARs received by telephone and fax were
processed within 24 hours, as required by
law. In this report, OAG's review of 53
drug TARs submitted through VDTS at
DHS' Stockton drug unit revealed that 52
of them were processed within 24 hours.
Also, OAG contacted four pharmacies
that had submitted TARs through the mail
to ask if beneficiaries ever suffered a lapse
in medication as a result of delays in the
process; none of the pharmacies were
aware of any lapses.
Report No. P-118 (March 1992). State

law requires all California counties to
design and implement "voter outreach"
programs to identify and register unregistered voters, and delegates to the Office of the Secretary of State (Office) the
responsibility for overseeing the counties'
programs; this report reviews the Office's
oversight of the voter outreach programs.
The report notes that twelve of the 58
counties surveyed do not have formal outreach programs; of the sixteen outreach
plans reviewed, twelve did not meet all of
the minimum requirements. According to
OAG, the Office's failure to annually
evaluate counties' programs in accordance with state regulations has contributed
to the counties' noncompliance. OAG also
found that the Office has used inappropriate methodologies and made
numerous miscalculations to reimburse
counties for their net costs in implementing voter registration and outreach, resulting in overpayments to many counties and
underpayments to a few others.
OAG recommended that the Office ensure that counties design and implement
voter outreach plans and programs that
meet state minimum requirements; annually evaluate county outreach
programs; and revise its methodology for
determining reimbursement figures.
Report No. F-101 (March 1992) is the
State of California's financial report for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1991. OAG
reported that the state spent approximately
$2.6 billion more than it generated in
revenues for that fiscal year; the state's
general fund ended the year with a deficit
of$3.5 billion. The report includes several
general purpose financial statements
regarding fiscal year 1990-91, such as a
combined balance sheet, a combined
statement of revenues, expenditures, and
changes in fund balances, and a combined
statement of cash flows.
Report No. F-133 (March 1992) concerns the state Board of Equalization's
(BOE) model for setting reimbursement
rates for special tax jurisdictions (STJs),
which are created by voters to support
transit agencies or other government services. Pursuant to Revenue and Taxation
Code section 7270, counties with STJs
must contract with BOE to administer
local transactions and use tax programs.
BOE currently administers the collection
and distribution of tax revenues for 27
STJs. Following its review of BOE's
method of setting a reimbursement rate for
this administration, OAG made the following findings:
-BOE's rate for reimbursement includes an overstatement of charges to
STJs for a portion of the costs related to
registering taxpayers, processing returns,

The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 12, Nos. 2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 1992)

INTERNAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW OF AGENCIES
auditing taxpayers, and collecting delinquent taxes in counties that do not have
STJs;
-BOE's reimbursement rate for STJs
in counties with two STJs is overstated,
and its rate for STJs in counties with one
STJ is understated because BOE misallocated $2.2 million in costs between the
two groups of STJs as a result of allocating
costs on the basis of revenue benefit rather
than workload basis;
-BO E's model does not adjust the rates
for the over- or under-collection of reimbursement in prior periods; and
-the workload standards used by the
Board are not quantifiable, resulting in
limited assurance that some costs allocated to the STJs are reasonable.
To ensure that the STJs pay an equitable reimbursement rate, OAG recommended that BOE exclude costs for
registering taxpayers, processing returns,
auditing accounts, and collecting taxes
receivable that are related to counties that
do not have STJs from costs that are
shared between the state, cities and/or
counties, and STJs; use a workload standard basis for allocating costs between
STJs located in counties with one STJ and
STJs located in counties with two STJs;
and incorporate an adjustment mechanism
into the model that considers the over- or
under-collection of reimbursement during
the previous period.
Report No. P-120 (April 1992) is a
comparison of financial and utilization
data for investor-owned and nonprofit
long-term care facilities. A facility is considered to be investor-owned when the net
earnings accrue to the sole proprietor,
partners, or shareholders owning the
facility; nonprofit entities include churchrelated and charitable corporations. In
1990, California had a total of 1,177
facilities that provided 35 .2 million
patient days of long-term care. Among
other things, OAG noted the following
about those facilities:
-A total of 125 facilities do not serve
Medi-Cal patients; 87 of these are investor-owned and 38 are nonprofit.
-Facilities cited several reasons for not
serving Medi-Cal patients, including low
reimbursement rates, excessive Medi-Cal
requirements, and designing and marketing facilities to serve only the affluent.
-87 investor-owned facilities not serving Medi-Cal patients reported that they
earned an aggregate net income of
$1,173,000 ($.62 per patient day) while
nonprofit facilities not serving Medi-Cal
patients reported aggregate net losses of
$7,887,000 ($12.26 per patient day).
-Investor-owned facilities serving
Medi-Cal patients paid $.15 per patient

day for income taxes and $.48 per patient
day for property taxes. Nonprofit facilities
serving Medi-Cal patients paid $.13 per
patient day for property taxes and paid no
income taxes.
Report No. P-125 (April 1992) concerns special education for pupils with
learning disabilities. As of April I, 1991,
179 school districts and county offices of
education reported to the state Department
of Education that they had 1,358 learningdisabled pupils enrolled in nonpublic
schools. OAG estimated that the total cost
of educating learning-disabled pupils in
nonpublic schools was over $20 million
during fiscal year 1990-91. Pupils with
exceptional needs who are ordered to
juvenile hall must also be provided with a
free, appropriate education. Data compiled from 42 local plan areas for special
education indicate that they spent approximate! y $2.5 million in special education funds during fiscal year 1990-91 to
provide special education services for
1,730 pupils in juvenile court schools. Of
that amount, over $2 million was used to
provide special education programs for
1,231 pupils with learning disabilities.
Report No. P-123 (May 1992) concerns the use of the California Disaster
Relief Fund to cover state costs resulting
from the October 1989 Loma Prieta
earthquake. OAG found that 19 agencies
and two programs received money from
this fund, the fund will be depleted in
fiscal year 1992-93, and the total estimated state costs of the earthquake exceed the fund's resources by approximately $677 million. To ensure that money in
the Disaster Relief Fund is properly
budgeted, OAG recommended that the
Department of Finance revise the Fund's
budget for fiscal year 1992-93 so that the
total combined amount of money transferred or scheduled to be transferred from
the Fund does not exceed the Fund's available money.
Other Audits. Additionally, OAG
produced the following reports during the
past few months:
-Report No. P-119 (January 1992)
surveys the compensation, retirement
benefits, and employment contracts at
school districts, community college districts, county offices of education, and
special districts;
-Report No. F-030 (February 1992)
reviews the state's allocations and expenditures at the state level of the additional
transportation funds made available by the
1989 Transportation Blueprint Legislation; and
-Report No. P-143 (April 1992)
reviews the food services at the California
Correctional Institution at Tehachapi.
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LEGISLATION:
AB 1944 (Campbell), as amended
January 13, requires the legislature to
reappropriate $6 million to the Department ofFinance (DOF) for expenditure by
DOF to support the costs of the Auditor
General associated with audits that are
mandated by state or federal statutes, or
both. This bill was signed by the Governor
on January 27 (Chapter I, Statutes of
1992).
AB 3036 (Eaves), as amended April
21, would require the Auditor General to
study the long-term financial impact on
the State Highway Account of the conversion of motor vehicles to low- or zeroemission alternative fuels, and report its
findings and recommendations to the
Governor and the legislature in draft form
by January I, 1994, and in final form by
March 1, 1994. [A. Floor]
SCA 34 (Maddy), as amended March
3, would ensure continuation of the Office
of the Auditor General and require it to
conduct independent, nonpartisan, professional audits as required by state or federal
law or as requested by the legislature. SCA
34 was chaptered on March 11 (Chapter 8,
Resolutions of I 992), and will appear on
the November ballot.
SB 1132 (Maddy) would have required
the Auditor General to complete audits in
accordance with the "Government Auditing Standards" issued by the Comptroller
of the United States. This bill died in the
Senate Rules Committee.
LITIGATION:
On March 9, the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the final legal challenge to
Proposition 140, the term limits initiative
approved by voters in November 1990.
[12:1 CRLR 3J] Without comment, the
justices refused to hear the state
legislators' challenge to the initiative,
which will result in a complete turnover of
the legislature within the next six years.
Last October, the California Supreme
Court voted 6-1 to uphold the term limits
set by Proposition 140, opining that
California's voters had made it clear that
they wanted to throw out of office "an
entrenched dynastic legislative
bureaucracy." In addition to term limitations, Proposition 140 also mandated a
38% cut in the legislature's budget, which
has severely affected funding and staffing
forOAG.
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